

**The Origins of a New Public
Management Approach in
Newfoundland and Labrador's
Strategic Social Plan**

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Introduction

The movement towards increasingly ‘civil,’ participatory societies is an international phenomenon posing new challenges for elected governments as citizens and community groups press for a stronger voice in political affairs. Due to diminished trust in government, many citizens are calling for greater involvement in the policymaking process and demanding new, more inclusive and meaningful models of citizen engagement. Some governments have attempted to improve the responsive and representative nature of political institutions by expanding the sphere of the decision-making process and relinquishing control over service delivery.

Two significant challenges currently face the Canadian government in this regard: (1) its ability to respond effectively to the rising demands of an increasingly educated and activist citizenry; and (2) a decline in Canadians’ confidence in [traditional representative] institutions.¹

There is growing interest at both the federal and provincial levels of Canadian government in developing innovative approaches to collaboration with the voluntary, community-based sector (VCBS) in the areas of policymaking and service provision. This movement has contributed to a growing recognition of the importance of voluntary, community-based sector in collaborative governance, whether in terms of delivering services, developing community capacity, managing resources, encouraging civic activity or in providing policy advice. Success, however, requires new relationships and a significant paradigm shift in the way governments operate.²

The Strategic Social Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador

Policy initiatives such as the Strategic Social Plan (SSP) for Newfoundland and Labrador represent one response, within the context of western democratic governments, to the problem of growing public disillusionment with current political systems. This paper explores the development of the SSP as a reflection of the dynamic interplay of historical factors, macro as well as micro political and economic changes occurring in the province, and as a product of the effort made by individuals and organizations in the local VCBS to shed light on social issues or find ways of working with government in addressing them. The SSP is unique and unlike the

negotiated agreements achieved in the U.K. (the Compacts), Croatia (the programme of cooperation) or at the federal level in Canada (the Accord)³. *People, Partners, and Prosperity: A Strategic Social Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador* is an internal policy document developed by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to provide a framework for social policy renewal in the province. Increased collaboration between the public and voluntary sectors is just one component of the plan. This does not mean, however, that voluntary, community-based organizations (VCBOs) were not active participants in the development of the SSP. In fact, the plan is best understood as government's response to a multiplicity of factors, not least among them the expanding community development movement and the growing activism of local VCBOs throughout the 1970s and '80s. Growing self-awareness of their role in society and conceptual developments like the population health model and the early intervention model led VCBOs to advocate principles that provide much of the the SSP's foundation long before its release in 1998. Examples include community-based service delivery, community involvement, multi-sectoral partnerships, prevention and early intervention, and collaborative approaches to social development. Although numerous political, economic, and social developments during the preceding decade lent resonance to these principles and provided the impetus for government acceptance, in many ways it was the voluntary, community-based sector that guided the development of the SSP and determined its form and character.

The Origins of the Strategic Social Plan

In his 1993 Speech From The Throne, then Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Honourable Clyde Wells, announced his government's intention to create a strategic social plan for the province. The proposed plan was presented as a complement to the province's Strategic Economic Plan (SEP), released in 1992. The aim of the SEP in establishing a "strong economic base," was to remain of primary importance, but the Premier held that "social issues [could not] be neglected in the process."⁴ Wells' announcement should be seen as the result of many factors arising both internally as well as external to the province, some even international in scope.

Some factors were internal, specifically the province's weak economic position, anticipated offshore oil and gas development, a crisis in the fishery; and the work of the research oriented Economic Recovery Commission (ERC), contributed to a growing awareness of the

need for a more innovative, horizontal, collaborative approach to planning and a policymaking framework that reflected a fundamental integration of social and economic issues and policies. Although the decision to develop a strategic social plan was not fully based on theory, at the most general level, external factors included the shift from Keynesian economics to neo-liberalism, the popularity of New Public Management (NPM) principles among political theorists and politicians, the community development movement, and growing recognition in many Western nations of the important contributions made by the voluntary, community-based sector (VCBS) to societal well being.

Factors Precipitating the Strategic Social Plan

A particularly salient factor influencing the provincial government's approach to social issues in the 1990s was the activities of the Community Services Council Newfoundland and Labrador (CSC), established in 1975 by local community and voluntary sector leaders. Officially opening its doors in 1976, the organization quickly became a significant force for social policy change in the province. Its primary aim was to create a structure that would assist and support VCBOs in working together, hoping that, by acting collectively, they might encourage a more cooperative relationship between government and the VCBS, promote independent social research, and strengthen social programs in the province.⁵

In the years immediately following its formation, the CSC undertook a number of social research projects and successfully lobbied provincial and municipal governments on behalf of various groups. Much of their work involved identifying unmet needs in the community and devising solutions, often requiring a policy change in the political arena. As a result, the CSC developed ongoing relationships with both politicians and civil servants, particularly those in the provincial Department of Social Services. Over time, many in the organization came to realize that, while important, piecemeal policy changes were not addressing the structural and procedural problems inherent in policy development and implementation. This shift in thinking was encouraged by ties to national community development organizations and the growing influence of concepts like community capacity building.⁶

CSC's concern for local social issues, however, did not match the identified priorities of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. By the 1980s, economic planning had

achieved a privileged status within the political arena, both federally and provincially. In Newfoundland and Labrador, interest in economic planning was heightened by the belief, held by many, that the only way to put the province on the pathway to development and economic self-sufficiency was through control of its natural resources. Chronic economic problems, a history of underdevelopment, and the influence of modernization and dependency theories, all contributed to government's focus on the economic benefits of offshore oil development as the most recent and most promising area of resource management and control. This was cause for concern among voluntary organizations like the CSC whose members believed that economic development on its own would do little to ameliorate, and could, in fact, aggravate existing social problems.

Recognizing the need for change if the consequences of development were to be addressed, the CSC began lobbying government to increase its planning and research capacity.⁷ Successive presentations to the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet demonstrate the evolution of this line of thinking at the CSC. While not all concerns centered on potentially negative consequences of resource development, this issue provided a convenient focus for the campaign to convince government members that more social planning was essential, in tandem with economic development. The CSC retained a focus on social constituents and briefs continued to draw attention to specific social sector concerns such as federal cuts in transfer payments and the needs of at risk groups like persons with disabilities, children in poverty and unemployed youth. CSC briefs noted many of these issues to be interrelated and articulated the need for a more integrative, collaborative, and preventative approach to public policy formulation. All of these were principles, which would eventually form the basis of the provincial social plan. As early as 1987, the CSC called for more social planning, social research and priority setting in Newfoundland and Labrador, urging government to set up a "Social Planning/Social Policy Advisory Council ... to develop a long term strategic plan within the social policy sector."⁸

Meanwhile, other prominent VCBOs, such as the local chapter of the Canadian Mental Health Association and the Provincial Advisory Council on the Status of Women (PACSW), had also begun advocating similar reforms in their meetings with government committees and officials. Although there were plenty of provincial issues motivating their campaign for policymaking reform, perhaps the most pressing factor pushing the voluntary sector to create a new relationship with government was federal cuts to provincial social services. By the late

1970s and early '80s, many Western governments had abandoned Keynesian economics in favour of neo-liberalism and in Canada, as elsewhere, this meant the dismantling of the welfare state created after World War II by redistributing responsibility for many programs and services to local levels of government and to the community. Funding for social programs and voluntary organizations were cut as were transfer payments to the provinces. These new federal policies were in part the result of a backlash against deficit-spending and big government as well as growing support for the principles of New Public Management (NPM).

By the 1980s, many political theorists, nationally and internationally, had begun arguing that developed Western nations were entering a period of rapid change with the shift from 'industrial-based' to 'knowledge-based' economies, necessitating a new approach to governing. This meant the rejection of the old 'Weberian' bureaucratic model of government and the adoption of New Public Management principles involving the transfer of service delivery from the state to the private and voluntary sectors, decentralization of power, administrative efficiency, smaller government, and the utilization of outside expertise. While this new approach offered the VCBS an expanded role in service provision and leant greater authority to their voice in the public policy arena based on service delivery experience, federal cuts to the sector reduced their ability to adequately assume these responsibilities.⁹

Under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and successive Conservative and Liberal governments, the Government of Canada allowed for the creation of a number of non-profit entities to provide services previously offered by the state and shifted responsibility for other services to existing voluntary organizations. The recession of 1990-91 increased pressure on governments already burdened with huge deficits as rates of unemployment rose, contributing to larger UI and welfare expenditures and a shrinking tax base. Federal governments of the 1990s responded to this challenge "by backing away from a leading role in social policy.... Ottawa cut its own spending for social programs to the bone and left provincial and territorial governments to cope with the problems dumped in their laps."¹⁰ These governments "coped" by passing federal cuts onto Canadians and by introducing their own cuts. Housing, health care and education services all suffered.

The general recession and the federal cuts hit Newfoundland particularly hard due to its already high rate of unemployment, an effect compounded by the closure of the ground fishery in 1992 which effectively eliminated more than 12,000 person-years of employment in the

province, most of which were part-year jobs resulting in excess of 30,000 people becoming eligible for income support from the Northern Cod Assistance Recovery Program (NCARP) and in 1994 The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS). The large number of marginal fisheries workers, who were not eligible for NCARP and TAGS, increased the Social Assistance caseload. A National Council of Welfare report summarized the situation, stating “From March 1990 to March 1996, the number of people on welfare jumped from 47,900 to 72,000. Nearly 20 percent of the population of Newfoundland depended on welfare at some point in 1996.”¹¹

Although provincial changes to the welfare system were less drastic than in other provinces, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador responded by freezing rates, cutting special assistance programs, and strengthening efforts to prevent abuse of programs. This increased the burden on voluntary and community organizations, yet in 1994, “at a time when social and economic difficulties were driving up demand for social services”¹² provincial grants to social agencies were frozen. Perhaps most worrisome for the VCBS in Newfoundland were proposed changes in 1995 to longstanding federal funding formulas and the introduction of a new funding order: the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). The voluntary, community-based sector had concerns that the flexibility now built into the transfer payment might erode financial support to the sector but it was the reductions in the CHST that had the greatest impact.

The federal reductions exacerbated the existing fiscal pressures on the province, resulting in a series of severe cuts to the voluntary, community-based sector and a reorganization of health, education and social services to reduce expenditures. This response by the provincial government downloaded the federal cuts to public sector and voluntary sector programs and services that had a cumulative impact on communities in communities. Communities felt the impacts through the closure of schools and social services offices, reduced municipal services, and services of the voluntary sector. Successive funding cuts to social services with each provincial budget raised fears among voluntary organizations that the sector would be overburdened by increased demands from clients for services no longer offered by government. The impacts were not merely financial, they also resulted in the loss of professionals in communities, such nurses, doctors, teachers, and social workers, who often formed the basis of community leadership.

Demographic changes associated with low fertility rates, high levels of out-migration and an aging population, created additional pressures demanding a response from government.

Those who remained in small rural communities in the province were concerned about the survival of their communities. The reduction of work for fish harvesters and plant workers, diversification of rural community economies, and the transition of workers in the fishery to other sectors were critical issues which required social programs to support basic income, training and retraining for other types of work, new economic opportunity identification and implementation of strategies to develop new industries at local and regional levels. People in communities began to mistrust of government, with many feeling government had an agenda to resettle rural Newfoundland and Labrador.

The provincial government had established the Economic Recovery Commission, and later government announced its intention to create a Strategic Economic Plan (SEP). It was clear that social issues were not on the agenda. Their approach to the SEP reflected many of the recommendations made by VCBOs over the previous decade regarding social policy formulation (e.g., long-term planning, coordinated approach, and public consultation), but with a focus on the province's future economic well-being.

Meanwhile, CSC representatives continued to voice the need for a more integrated and collaborative approach to policy formulation and service delivery, more planning and research, less crisis intervention and more prevention, and the integration of social and economic policies. Advocating the development of a social planning framework, the CSC argued, "... an economic strategy will fail in Newfoundland without a parallel strategic plan for the social sector designed to support rather than thwart economic development and to make our people less dependent."¹⁴ The CSC reiterated this point in its brief to the committee overseeing the public consultation process on the SEP, expressing disappointment with an absence of social issues in the government consultation paper. While supportive of many aspects of the plan, especially an integrated, rational approach to decision-making, the CSC was concerned that the measures proposed would not ensure full and equal participation of all Newfoundlanders in the social and economic benefits of development. The organization, therefore, recommended the creation of a parallel Strategic Social Plan and, in the longer term, an integrated Strategic Social and Economic Plan. This, it was argued, should involve cooperative and collaborative links between the federal and provincial governments and the community/voluntary sector.¹⁵

In a follow-up letter to the Advisory Council on the Economy, the organization responsible for the consultation process, CSC's executive director repeated these concerns,

stating that the consultation paper was significantly flawed by its limited focus: “No long term strategic plan to improve the economy of our province will be successful without a parallel focus on ‘social policy’ matters. I assume that the rationale for improving our economy is to improve the well-being of its citizens; therefore, the province must actively consider the deficits which large numbers of our citizens face before it can be assumed that they will be able to contribute to and benefit from economic recovery.”¹⁶

The letter also emphasized the importance of the voluntary sector in economic development as a source of energy, expertise, and new ideas as well as in advocating social change, arguing that “The value of volunteer activities is enormous and it would ... be prudent for the provincial government to provide more administrative support to such groups to ensure that they can continue to be a major support in developing the economy of Newfoundland and Labrador.”¹⁷

Developing the Strategic Social Plan

By the early 1990s, such recommendations had gained significance. Faced with a growing deficit, a recession, federal funding cuts, the cod moratorium, out-migration, and climbing welfare and employment insurance expenditures, the provincial government had to find a new approach to program delivery and policymaking if it was to meet the challenge of providing “an appropriate level and quality of services” to Newfoundlanders and Labradorians. Governments at all levels, faced with a rising tide of criticism over funding cuts and the offloading of services, “were forced to acknowledge that they could no longer govern alone.”¹⁸ They were obliged, as a result, to reconsider their relationship with other sectors, especially the voluntary sector, necessitating a redefinition of their respective roles in society. This has contributed to the development of agreements or “accords” between governments and the voluntary sector, both in Canada and elsewhere, which attempt to establish a framework for collaboration.¹⁹

Newfoundland and Labrador was among the vanguard of this movement. The Wells government announced its intention to develop a strategic social plan in 1993. This plan was intended to serve as a guide for future social policy by establishing priorities, objectives and strategies for social programs as well as define government’s relationship with the voluntary

sector and the role of the sector in the policymaking process and service delivery. Provincial government commitment remained strong through the formation period. Preparation for a strategic social plan survived at least one major change of government. When Premier Wells stepped down after a decade of leadership, incoming Premier Brian Tobin almost immediately affirmed his support for the initiative. Tobin instituted a departmental review process, which confirmed growing fears about the sustainability of government programs. Falling revenues, a declining and aging population base, high unemployment and an economic recession were taking their toll on the government's coffers and seriously threatening its ability to deliver services. Greater awareness of these factors helped ensure the SSP's place on the government's agenda. In this context, the SSP appeared to offer an innovative and proactive response to the crisis.

Under Wells, a working group of deputy ministers and directors, representing the various "social" departments, had been appointed to develop a consultation paper on the SSP. This was subsequently rewritten by the Tobin government and released in 1996.²⁰ The government established a Social Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC), comprised of fifteen representatives from various sectors external to government, who were asked to conduct a public dialogue on the SSP and create a "road map" for social policy renewal. Given free rein to design and conduct the consultation process, SPAC traveled around the province, holding public meetings, conducting roundtables, reviewing briefs, and listening to presentations from individuals, voluntary organizations, community groups, and other stakeholders on the concept of a strategic social plan.

The concerns voiced by voluntary, community-based organizations during the public dialogue on the SSP were many and varied, yet there was significant overlap in statements regarding the government's relationship with the sector. Although many advocated a more collaborative arrangement between the two sectors, a large number of organizations expressed doubt about government's motivations in seeking partnerships, citing examples of recent funding cuts and the offloading of services to VCBOs as evidence of government's attempts to reduce the cost of service provision by abrogating responsibility for program delivery. While most emphasized the important and essential role played by volunteers and voluntary organizations in building capacity and strengthening communities and agreed that VCBOs should assume a greater role in the policymaking process, program design and service delivery, they were clearly wary that enhanced responsibilities would not be accompanied by sufficient government funds.

Pressure on organizations to constantly fundraise and resulting volunteer burnout were already common sector complaints, a situation expected to worsen as governments attempted to reduce deficits by further cutting services.

After hearing from approximately 1500 individuals and organizations, SPAC prepared a two-volume report outlining what had been said and made recommendations on an approach to a strategic social plan. Volume I detailed what the committee heard during the public dialogue conducted across the province. It revealed the concerns and fears expressed by many about the survival of their communities and way of life as well as their hopes for the future. Volume II presented broad themes coming out of the consultation process and incorporated innovative social policy thinking being discussed nationally and internationally. Although Newfoundland and Labrador was facing a number of regional difficulties not faced by other provinces and countries, many of the pressures necessitating a new approach to governing were widespread and were the precipitating factors in similar reforms elsewhere. Issues of governance, collaborative partnerships, public consultation, citizen engagement and accountability were gaining attention in many countries dealing with the effects of government withdrawal from the social arena and growing disillusionment with governments' ability to be representative of their constituents and responsive to citizen needs. Consequently, SPAC's recommendations for the SSP represented a consolidation of local issues with national and international policy trends.²¹

Although originally envisioned as a series of program-directed recommendations, the report actually proposed a framework for social policy renewal in the province, one "based on investing in people by integrating social and economic development initiatives and by strengthening individual, family and community resources." This, the committee argued, required "new attitudes, new ways of doing things and the sharing of responsibility and resources. Policies, attitudes, programs and relationships must be re-framed to deal with the circumstances which create social problems and to remove the barriers which hinder people from reaching their full potential."²² The provincial government accepted the report and created both an interdepartmental and a ministerial committee to translate recommendations into government policy. *People, Partners and Prosperity: A Strategic Social Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador*, released in 1998, was government's answer to the concerns expressed and issues raised during the consultation process and the recommended response outlined in SPAC's proposed framework.

The SSP as a Model for Collaborative Government

Among the stated aims of the SSP were: vibrant communities, sustainable regions, self-reliant, healthy, educated individuals, and integrated, evidenced-based policy development. An identified means of achieving these goals was through a “partnership approach”:

“Community groups, regional boards, individuals and government working together toward common goals and objectives can draw on their different backgrounds, expertise and strengths to achieve the broad solutions that this Plan seeks. Government cannot do it alone.”²³ While government was to work with others in implementing the principles of the SSP, however, the Plan also affirmed government’s responsibility to establish policy directions, allocate resources, and create standards for program delivery to ensure accountability.

The new partnership approach involved more interdepartmental collaboration in planning and program design, an attempt to better coordinate provincial programs with those offered by the federal government, and more communication and cooperation within and among levels of government. But just as important, was the government’s commitment to partnering with community groups in order to address problems holistically, with a greater emphasis on early intervention and prevention. The Plan, therefore, “reinforces that effective solutions arise from a *shared* sense of responsibility and a capacity to act which only comes from involving people.”²⁴ According to the Plan, this was to be achieved by creating a Premier’s Council on Social Development, composed of community members able to advise government on ways of achieving SSP objectives, and forming regional partnerships with representatives of the various boards around the province (e.g., health boards, school boards, economic boards).

Finally, the SSP recognized the importance of involving the voluntary sector in implementation and committed government to working to strengthen the sector. As builders of social capital, voluntary organizations can help identify local needs and opportunities and devise solutions or strategies. The SSP, therefore, suggested that it is incumbent upon government to “place greater emphasis on partnering with this sector to achieve its social development goals.”²⁵

Although the SSP was a government initiative, as opposed to a negotiated agreement between government and the voluntary sector like the Compact or Accord, it still reflected many of the principles advocated by VCBOs and consultation participants regarding collaborative

governance, evidence-based decision-making, and community capacity building. In fact, the SSP may be seen as originating in the voluntary, community-based sector given the pivotal role played by sector representatives in its development as early advocates of social planning and as participants in the consultation process.

Just how successful the provincial government and its partners were in achieving the goals of the SSP remains to be seen. Although originally conceived as a program-directed plan of action, the Strategic Social Plan was actually *a framework* meant to create a common vision of provincial social development by defining the roles and responsibilities of the various sectors, establishing objectives, and suggesting general strategies for implementation while proposing few specific measures for actually achieving these goals.

Lessons Learned

The SSP promoted a change in the way the provincial government does business by adopting a New Public Management approach. The impetus for the plan was two-fold, the massive economic upheaval from the closure of the northern cod fishery, and the reductions in the government investment in public and the voluntary, community-based social programs and services. Although federal reductions to the CHST were causing changes to social programs in other provinces of Canada, in Newfoundland and Labrador this was coupled with widespread economic change in a primary industry where thousands of jobs were lost. Every community in the province, but particularly in small rural communities, felt the impacts of jobs losses coupled with social program reductions. The negative social and economic climate had resulted in a desire by people for change.

In this uncertain social and economic environment, the Social Policy Advisory Committee was established to undertake a public consultation on a social plan for the province. This Committee was comprised of individuals from the voluntary, community-based sector, regional boards and institutions delivering public services (e.g. health and education), representatives of population groups (e.g. youth and seniors) and municipalities. The Committee was chaired by the CEO of the Community Services Council who had long been promoting change in the relationship between the community and government. Staff had been seconded from the Economic Recovery Commission that worked on concepts related to the integration of social and economic development. Most SPAC members had first-hand experienced with the

negative impacts the cuts to social programs were having on their clients and on their organizations. SPAC's non-bureaucratic influence on the SSP was to be significant, and many wanted more involvement in decision-making by governments. Their experiences with clients, unstable social programs, under-funded voluntary organizations fuelled their desire to establish a legitimate role for the social sector in the development of the province. Their interests were focused on partnerships, collaborative governance and government accountability.

The SSP shifted social programs away from the traditional "people-based" approach to a community-based, "place-based" approach. At the time the SSP was released, this was highly unusual in a country where all social programs were people-based. It was this shift that required a restructuring in the way business was done by government to a New Public Management approach. SPAC's recommendations, and subsequently the SSP, were based on values held by the people of the province that the development and well-being of their communities was of the highest importance, and the survival of their communities was under threat. At the time, it seemed that people believed that government had created their current hardship by reducing funding across all sectors with little awareness or concern about the holistic impact on communities and people. People in the province had begun to develop high levels of mistrust of government and wanted more control over the future of their communities. Partnerships, collaboration, community capacity and government accountability would help shift responsibility and decision-making authority to communities and collaborative governance was required to shift direction from people to places.

The New Public Management approach of the SSP grew from the grassroots. SPAC's conclusion of the consultation was that people in communities felt the way government was doing business was not working for their communities. SPAC attempted to find solutions to complex problems discussed at community levels. A series of strategies were developed to address these problems. Although SPAC did not specifically recommend a NPM approach, when these strategies were wrapped together, they had come to the same conclusions those theorists had on NPM.

The SSP was considered to be highly innovative across Canada and internationally. The shift to "place-based" from the traditional "people-based" approach of social programs; the establishment of collaborative governance and partnership approaches; the recognition of the importance of integrated social and economic development; the shift to a community

development approach to social development; and the shift to a preventative focus from traditional remedial approaches were applauded by social policy-makers inside and outside of government. If the SSP truly was a NPM approach, its birth was in the crisis that had occurred in communities that had impacted so many Newfoundlanders and Labradorians.

¹Thérèse Arseneau, Robert M. Campbell and A. Brian Tanguay, "Reforming Canada's Political Institutions for the Twenty-first Century," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 35(4), 2001, 8.

²Susan Phillips, "More Than Just Stakeholders: Reforming State-Voluntary Relations," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 35(4), 2001, 182-3; Stuart Etherington, "Developing Collaborative Relationships Between Civil Society and Government: The Compact Between the UK Government and Voluntary Sector in England." *Asian Review of Public Administration*, 12(1), 2000, 99-100 (<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/eropa/arpa-janjun2000-etherington.pdf>); Ján Bucek and Brian Smith, "New approaches to local democracy: direct democracy, participation and the 'third sector,'" *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Vol. 18, 2000, 10-13.

³Les Hems, "Developing Effective Government and Civil Society Relationships," A paper presented at the Civicus Europe Meeting, February 2002 (<http://www.civicusineurope.org/docs/gov-civilsocietyrelations.rtf>).

⁴Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *Speech from the Throne*, 4 March 1993.

⁵Community Services Council, *CSC History: Pioneering Innovative Programs and Services* (<http://www.envision.ca/templates/aboutcsc.asp?ID=62>).

⁶In 1980, the CSC raised local awareness of development issues when it hosted the Biennial Social Welfare Policy Conference, managed by the Canadian Council on Social Development, in St. John's.

⁷"CSC Presentations to the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet," 27 February 1984, 1985, and 29 January 1986.

⁸"CSC presentation to the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet," 1985 and 29 January 1986; "Notes and Impressions on the Brief to the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet," ca. 29 January 1986; "Minutes of meeting to discuss CSC's brief to the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet," 27 March 1987; and "Second Annual CSC Brief to the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet," 30 March 1987.

⁹Alan Tupper, "The Contested Terrain of Canadian Public Administration in Canada's Third Century," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 35(4), 2001, 148-50.

¹⁰National Council of Welfare, *Another Look at Welfare Reform*, a report by the National Council of Welfare, 1997 (<http://www.ncwcnbes.net/htmldocument/reportanotherlook/repanolook.htm>).

¹¹*Another Look at Welfare Reform*; Malcolm Rowe and Vivian Randell, "Newfoundland and Labrador's Strategic Social Plan," Susan Delacourt and Donald Lenihan, eds., *Collaborative Government: Is There a Canadian Way?* (Toronto: IPAC, 1999) 81-2.

¹²*Another Look at Welfare Reform*; Rowe and Randell, "Newfoundland and Labrador's Strategic Social Plan," 81-2.

¹³CHST was to replace the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) which had ensured welfare provision to all Canadians "in need." CAP also demanded that the provinces allow welfare applicants to appeal decisions and did not allow provinces to impose residence requirements. CHST removed most of these protections. *Another Look at Welfare Reform*.

¹⁴"CSC Brief to the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet," 6 February 1991.

¹⁵While the CSC had long argued the need for combining social and economic issues in the policy formulation process, its members realized that social planning was so far behind economic planning in the province that some catch-up time would be essential before the two approaches could be combined. "A Brief on the Consultation Paper on a Strategic Economic Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador," 14 November 1991.

¹⁶"Letter from Penelope Rowe to H.W. Lundrigan," 2 December 1991.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Rachel Laforest and Susan Phillips, "Rethinking Civil Society-State Relationships: Quebec and Canada at the Crossroads," a Centre for Voluntary Sector Research & Development discussion paper, 2001, 2 (http://www.cvsrd.org/eng/discussion_papers/engP_S.doc).

¹⁹Kathleen Ross and Stephen P. Osborne, "Making a reality of community governance. Structuring government-voluntary sector relationship at the local level," PAC Annual Conference, 1999 (<http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/poli/pac/papers/ross.htm>); Susan Phillips, "A Federal Government-Voluntary Sector

Accord: Implications for Canada's Voluntary Sector," a report prepared for the Voluntary Sector Initiative Secretariat, 2001 (http://www.vsi-isbc.ca/eng/joint_tables/accord/phillips_text/doc3.cfm).

²⁰Also included in the working group were two external representatives, Ms. Penelope M. Rowe, CSC's executive director, and Dr. Douglas House, a Memorial University sociologist who had headed up the government's Economic Recovery Commission and who had also been involved in drafting the SEP consultation paper. In this way, the process closely mirrored that used in developing the SEP because the Wells government did not want the plans to end up shelved as was the case with many external commission reports. Nor did they want these to be completely internal documents as both bureaucratic and public buy in were considered essential to their success.

²¹Phillips, "More Than Just Stakeholders," 182-3; Kathy Brock, "State, Society and the Third Sector: Changing to Meet New Challenges," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 35(4), 2001, 203-4; Steve Patten, "Democratizing the Institutions of Policy-making: Democratic Consultation and Participatory Administration," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 35(4), 2001, 222-4.

²²SPAC, *Volume 1: What the People Said* (St. John's, NL: Office of the Queen's Printer, 1997); SPAC, *Volume 2: Investing in People and Communities* (St. John's, NL: Office of the Queen's Printer, 1997).

²³Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, *People, Partners, and Prosperity: A Strategic Social Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador* (St. John's, NL: Office of the Queen's Printer, 1998).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*